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GEOPOLITICS, JURISDICTION AND SURVEILLANCE
INTRODUCTION
With this special issue we offer critical commentary and analysis of the geopolitics of data,
transnational  surveillance  and  jurisdiction,  and  reflect  upon  the  question  of  if  and  how
individual rights can be protected in an era of ubiquitous transnational surveillance conducted
by private companies and governments alike. The internet provides a number of challenges, and
opportunities, for exercising power, and regulating, extraterritorially to the sovereign nation
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state.  These  practices  are  shaped  and  influenced  by  geopolitical  relations  between  states.
Certainly, the trans-jurisdictional nature of the internet means that the legal geographies of the
contemporary  digital  world  require  rethinking,  especially  in  light  of  calls  for  a  more
sophisticated  and  nuanced  approach  to  understanding  sovereignty  to  govern,  and  also
protecting individual rights in the electronic age (Johnson & Post, 1996; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006;
Brenner,  2009; Hilderbrandt,  2013;  Svantesson,  2013;  2014; 2017;  DeNardis,  2014).  These
issues raise a host of additional contemporary and historical questions about attempts by the US
to  exert  power  over  extraterritorial  conduct  in  various  fields  including  crime,  intellectual
property,  surveillance  and  national  security  (see  e.g.,  Bauman et  al.,  2014;  Boister,  2015;
Schiller,  2011).  Yet  dynamics  are  shifting  with  the  emergence  of  the  new  technological
superpower China, and regulatory efforts of the European Union (for example via the General
Data  Protection  Regulation).  The  emergence  of  large  transnational  corporations  providing
critical virtual and physical infrastructure adds private governance to this equation, which offers
further new dimensions to the rule of law and also self-  or co-regulation (see for example
Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; DeNardis & Hackl, 2015; Brown & Marsden, 2013; Daly, 2016).
The idea for this special issue emerged from a workshop that we co-convened in 2016 in which
we sought to explore a range of questions: the impact of domestic and international cybercrime,
data  protection  and  intellectual  property  laws  on  sovereignty  and  extraterritoriality;  the
geopolitical impacts of domestic and international surveillance and cybercrime laws such as the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), the recent United States
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act and other lawful access regimes including
European Union e-Evidence proposals;  the application of  due process  requirements  in the
contemporary  policing  of  digital  spaces;  the  objectives  of  justice  in  the  study  of  private
governance in online environments; and the implications of these transnational developments
for current and future policy and regulation of online activities and spaces.
Since  2016,  we have witnessed striking developments  in  the  geopolitical  and geoeconomic
relationships  between  states,  global  technology  companies,  their  transnational  surveillance
practices, and corresponding governance frameworks. In particular, the rise of China and the
globalisation of its internet industry is a major development in this time, along with the Trump
presidency in the US and the ensuing trade war (Daly, in press). Just in the weeks prior to the
publication of this special issue, there was significant escalation of tensions between the US and
China played out via the restriction of social media companies’ access to the US market. On 6
August 2020, Donald Trump issued executive orders banning transactions with ByteDance (Tik
Tok’s  parent  company)  and  Tencent  (WeChat’s  parent  company)  that  are  subject  to  US
jurisdiction, stating that “the spread in the United States of mobile applications developed and
owned by  companies  in  the  People’s  Republic  of  China (China)  continues  to  threaten the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States ”. Surveillance and sharing
US citizens’ data with the Chinese Communist Party, protection of intellectual property from
corporate espionage,  and Chinese censorship and disinformation were cited as justification
supporting the purge.  Subsequently,  Trump issued a further executive order requiring that
ByteDance sell off all  of TikTok’s US based assets. These types of geopolitical struggles are
examined further in Cartwright’s timely contribution to this special issue on ‘Internationalising
state power through the internet’ (Cartwright, 2020).
Further to the recent US-Chinese tensions, in the month prior to publication of this collection,
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) handed down its landmark decision in Data Protection
Commissioner v  Facebook Ireland Limited,  Maximillian Schrems   (“  Schrems II”)  (2020)
invalidating the EU-US Privacy Shield (following Schrems I invalidating the predecessor EU-US
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Safe Harbour agreement in 2015) with significant ramifications for the transfer of the data of EU
citizens to the US as a consequence of the US’ extensive state surveillance, and insufficient
safeguards protecting privacy. The exact impacts that this decision will have for transborder
data transfers are yet to be fully understood, but will undoubtedly be significant. At the same
time, the US is negotiating executive agreements under its Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of
Data (CLOUD) Act that allow for authorised states to access the content of communications held
by US technology companies without prior judicial authorisation, and for the US to compel US
technology companies to provide access to data stored extraterritorially to the US jurisdiction
(as per the initial Microsoft case rendered moot by the introduction of the CLOUD Act, see
further Warren, 2015; Svantesson, 2017; Mann & Warren, 2018; Mulligan, 2018).
This  all  comes  at  a  time  when  nations,  and  indeed  regions,  are  asserting  their  “digital
sovereignty” through data localisation initiatives that limit transborder data flows, as witnessed
recently  with  France  and  Germany  enacting  their  plans  for  European  digital  sovereignty
(ANSSI, n.d.) and the corresponding launch of the GAIA-X cloud computing project (GAIA-X,
n.d.) that creates a European data infrastructure independent of both China and the US.
China has also started asserting itself legally beyond its territorial borders. Hong Kong’s new
controversial  National  Security  Law  includes  provisions  which  criminalise  secession,
subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign powers and via Art 38, purports to apply to
non-HK  permanent  residents  committing  these  offences  even  if  they  are  based  in  other
countries. In addition, Art 43 enables the Hong Kong Police Force when investigating national
security crimes to direct service providers to remove content and provide other assistance. How
these provisions will  be  applied to  Hong Kong’s  transnational  internet  (which to  date  has
included both Chinese and Western internet companies and services including some which are
banned in mainland China) remains unclear, some US-based companies such as Facebook and
Twitter have already announced their suspension of compliance with data requests from the
Hong Kong authorities (Liao, 2020).
Taken together, these most recent developments highlight the significance of the geopolitical
and  geoeconomic  dimensions  of  data,  private-public  surveillance  interests,  and  associated
impacts for human rights and international trade. They also demonstrate that extraterritoriality
is no longer just a feature of US internet law and policy and equally that national sovereignty is
no longer just a feature of Chinese internet law and policy.
These dimensions become more relevant with the concurrent reinforcement of physical borders
amid  a  new  global  crisis  brought  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic  that  also  has  significant
implications for cross-border information sharing and data storage e.g., immunity passports,
contact tracing applications with data stored on the cloud (see Taylor et al., 2020). Certainly,
expanded surveillance and information collection by states and private companies have proven
to be central to the global response to bio(in)security created by the pandemic, with significant
extraterritorial  implications  (Privacy  International,  2020).  For  example,  one  of  the  main
criticisms leveled at the Australian COVIDSafe contact tracing application was that Amazon was
contracted to host the contact tracing information on its web services (AWS), with the potential
for the US to access the data via the US technology company. In response, and like Germany and
France, the Australian government is considering the development of a “sovereign cloud” for the
storage of Australia's data (Besser & Welch, 2020; Sadler, 2020). Nevertheless, the pandemic
response has also demonstrated the transnational corporate power of Google and Apple as key
gatekeepers to the operation of government-backed COVID contact tracking apps, despite the
questionable or unproven effectiveness of these apps in automating contact tracing (Braithwaite
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et al., 2020). Google and Apple have even become the source of apps that offer improved data
protection when compared to the in-house attempts of various European governments to create
their own apps (Daly, in press), yet simultaneously cement their infrastructural power (Veale,
2020).
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE
With these brief introductory remarks in mind, we turn to the overview of the papers and their
main contributions to this issue. We open the collection with Oskar J. Gstrein’s contribution
‘Mapping  power  and  jurisdiction  on  the  internet  through  the  lens  of  government-led
surveillance’  (Gstrein,  2020)   that  examines  governance  frameworks  for  the  regulation  of
government-driven surveillance to avoid the ‘balkanisation’ of the internet. Two proposals are
analysed, namely, the ‘Working Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and
Privacy’, presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the proposal for a ‘Digital
Geneva  Convention’  (DGC)  by  Microsoft’s  Brad Smith.  The  article  questions  whether  it  is
possible to create an internet based on human rights principles and values. Interlinked with
issues of human rights online, our own (along with Adam Molnar) contribution on ‘Regulatory
arbitrage  and  transnational  surveillance’  (Mann,  Daly,  &  Molnar,  2020)  examines
developments  regarding  encryption  law  and  policy  within  ‘Five  Eyes’  (FVEY)  countries,
specifically  the  Telecommunications  and  Other  Legislation  Amendment  (Assistance  and
Access) Act 2018 (Cth 1) in Australia. We argue that this new law is significant both domestically
and internationally given its extraterritorial reach enables the development of new ways for
Australian law enforcement and security agencies to access encrypted telecommunications via
transnational providers, and allows for Australian authorities to assist foreign counterparts in
both enforcing and potentially circumventing their domestic laws. We show that deficiencies in
Australian human rights protections are the ‘weak link’ in the FVEY alliance, which means there
is the possibility for regulatory arbitrage to exploit these new surveillance powers to undermine
encryption, at a global scale, via Australia.
Madison Cartwright’s  article  ‘Internationalising state  power through the  internet:  Google,
Huawei and geopolitical struggle’  (Cartwright,  2020) shows how the US has exploited the
international market dominance of US-based internet companies to internationalise its own
state power through surveillance programmes. Using Huawei as a case study, Cartwright also
examines how Chinese companies threaten the dominance of US companies as well  as the
geopolitical power of the US state, and in response, how the US has sought to shrink the ‘geo-
economic space’ available to Huawei by using its firms, such as Google, to disrupt Huawei’s
supply chains. The analysis demonstrates how states may use internet companies to exercise
power and authority beyond their borders. Extraterritorial exercise of power by non-state actors
is explored further in ‘Public and private just wars: distributed cyber deterrence based on
Vitoria and Grotius’ (Thumfart, 2020). In Johannes Thumfart’s contribution, the role of non-
state actors in cyber attacks are considered from the perspective of just war theory. He argues
that private and public cyber deterrence capacities form a system of distributed deterrence that
is preferential to state-based deterrence alone.
In ‘Going global: Comparing Chinese mobile applications’ data and user privacy governance
at home and abroad’ Lianrui Jia and Lotus Ruan argue that differential levels of privacy and
data  protection  demonstrate  the  importance  of  jurisdictional  influences  in  the  regulatory
environment and argue this shapes the global expansion of Chinese internet companies (Jia &
Ruan, 2020). They examine the governance of Chinese mobile applications at a global scale and
Geopolitics, jurisdiction and surveillance
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 6 September 2020 | Volume 9 | Issue 3
their  comparative  analysis  of  international-facing  versions  of  Chinese  mobile  apps  versus
Chinese-facing versions demonstrates greater levels of data protection are proffered to those
users located outside China than those within. Continuing with the theme of transnational data
protection,  in ‘Transnational collective actions for cross-border data protection violations’
Federica  Casarosa  examines  alternative  forms  of  enforcement,  specifically,  transnational
collective actions in the European Union as an avenue to empower data subjects and achieve
remedies for data protection infringements (Casarosa, 2020). Casarosa uses the Cambridge
Analytica-Facebook scandal to highlight the multijurisdictional and cross-border nature of data
protection violations, examines some of the limits of existing redress mechanisms under the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and argues for greater scope for transnational
collective actions where associations or non-government organisations represent claimants from
various jurisdictions.
Cross-border  access  to  data  is  a  central  concern  for  transnational  online  policing.  In  the
contribution on ‘The legal geographies of extradition and sovereign power’ Sally Kennedy and
Ian Warren raise a series of questions about access, use and exchange of digital evidence under
mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) requirements (Kennedy & Warren, 2020). Via a case
study concerning a Canadian citizen facing extradition to the US, they show how US sovereignty
and criminal enforcement powers are advanced with implications for global online criminal
investigations. Their analysis shows a need for clearer transnational data exchange protocols or
the possibility of shifting prosecution forums to the source of online harm, arguing that this
would promote fairness for those accused of online crimes with a cross-jurisdictional aspect.
Matters of e-evidence are further explored in ‘Anchoring the need to revise cross-border access
to  e-evidence’  in  which  Sergie  Vazquez  Maymir  examines  the  European  Commission’s  e-
evidence  package,  including  the  ‘Proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  European  Production  and
Preservation Orders’ and associated impact assessment. He critically analyses the arguments
and evidence supporting the EPO regulation and the policy  shift  away from Mutual  Legal
Assistance to direct cooperation. Vazquez Maymir argues that the problems associated with
cross border access to e-evidence are framed in terms of technical and efficiency considerations,
and in doing so, the political and economic motivations are lost.
CONCLUSION
Utilising, and in some cases exploiting, information communication technology to exert private
and  public  power  across  multiple  jurisdictions  undoubtedly  creates  new  challenges  for
traditional forms of regulatory governance and the protection of human rights. Each of the
papers in this collection raise and speak to critical questions about the type of internet that we
want (free, open, unified and decentralised?), and the role that states and companies (should)
play in creating it.  The papers demonstrate the significance of the internet as a forum for
geopolitical struggle and the weaponisation of jurisdiction, especially with exterritorial reach,
for  states  to  extend their  power  beyond their  own borders  directly,  and via  transnational
companies.
While the US,  due to historical  reasons as the birthplace of  the internet and the de facto
international hegemon in the 1990s/2000s, has been the focus for private and public extensions
of political and economic power via the internet, the increasing multipolarity of the world and
its impact on technology law and policy is impacting upon the relationship between jurisdiction
and power online, as can be seen through this collection’s contributions. The EU has been
gaining prominence as a ‘regulatory superpower’ especially since the introduction of the GDPR,
Geopolitics, jurisdiction and surveillance
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 7 September 2020 | Volume 9 | Issue 3
and the emergence of  China as  a  global  internet  player  is  now also apparent  through the
globalisation  of  its  internet  services  and the  extraterritorial  reach  of  the  new Hong Kong
National Security Law. Increasing attention ought to be paid to such developments beyond the
US and EU, particularly from BRICS countries, and how these interact with, and impact upon,
global internet governance and internet law and policy with the West too.
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